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Exploring the “Myth of Parity” in State Taxation: 
State Court Decisions Interpreting Public Law 86–272 
Bradley W. Joondeph 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1875, federal courts have had the authority to hear most 
“cases” or “controversies” in which the plaintiff has alleged the 
deprivation of a right or privilege protected by federal law.1 Article 
III of the Constitution, which establishes the limits of the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,2 states that “[t]he judicial 
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”3 And through 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, Congress has provided the federal courts with 
jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.”4  
General “federal question” jurisdiction, however, does not extend 
to cases in which plaintiffs challenge the lawfulness of state or local 
taxes. Longstanding equity practice dictates that federal courts must 
 
  Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. I owe thanks to the 
participants in a workshop on empirical research in taxation at Washington University in St. 
Louis, especially Nancy Staudt and Peter Wiedenbeck. I received helpful comments on 
previous drafts from Andrew Berke, Jeff Kahn, Gary Neustadter, Gary Spitko, Srija Srinivasan, 
and John Swain. Finally, a special thanks to Chris DiCarlo, whose research assistance made this 
article possible. 
 1. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)). 
See also Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401–02 (1973); Gerald Gunther, 
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the 
Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 913 (1984). 
 2. See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 173–75 (1803); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.4, at 207 (3d 
ed. 1999).  
 3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
205 
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withhold equitable relief in such cases when the taxpayer has an 
adequate legal remedy in state court.5 In 1937, Congress codified this 
practice in the Tax Injunction Act, which states that “[t]he district 
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or 
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”6  
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Tax Injunction Act quite 
broadly, such that federal district courts are now virtually precluded 
from hearing any state or local tax suit.7 The Court has also ruled that 
the principle of comity between federal courts and state governments 
precludes taxpayers from bringing actions for damages against state 
tax administrators in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, at least 
when state law offers an adequate legal remedy.8 Moreover, even in 
cases where these barriers are inapplicable, the Eleventh Amendment 
prevents taxpayers from suing unconsenting states in federal court to 
obtain retrospective relief.9 In short, state courts are generally the 
only forum available to taxpayers for claims that state or local taxes 
violate federal law. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed its belief that the 
lack of a federal forum for such claims should not concern taxpayers. 
Aside from its rather expansive readings of the Tax Injunction Act, 
the Act’s antecedent equity practice, and the principle of comity, the 
Court has more generally embraced a theory of “parity” between the 
federal and state courts—a belief that the federal and state judiciaries 
 
 5. This practice dates back to the mid-1800s. See, e.g., Matthews v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 
521, 525–26 (1932); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Benedict, 229 U.S. 481, 488 (1913); Boise 
Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 282 (1909); Shelton v. Platt, 139 
U.S. 591, 595–96 (1891); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 113 U.S. 516, 525 (1885); Dows v. City 
of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 110 (1870).  
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). 
 7. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 411 (1982); Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 297 (1943); JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & 
WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 1062 (7th ed. 2001); Note, Clarifying 
Comity: State Court Jurisdiction and Section 1983 Tax Challenges, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1888, 
1888 (1990).  
 8. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981). 
 9. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1945). See 
also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-25, at 521-29 (3d ed. 2000) 
(discussing Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence). 
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are equally competent in deciding questions of federal law.10 The 
Court has stated that it is “unwilling to assume the States will refuse 
to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United 
States,”11 and that a “doctrine based on the inherent inadequacy of 
state forums would run counter to basic principles of federalism.”12  
Many observers dispute this parity theory, labeling it a convenient 
but dangerous myth.13 Specifically in the field of state and local 
taxation, lawyers have expressed their distrust of state courts’ 
capacity or willingness to protect the federal rights of taxpayers, 
especially when those taxpayers are domiciled outside the taxing 
state.14 The common view seems to be that, because a “state’s own 
judges, under the existing system, define the state’s power to tax,” the 
“taxpayer’s likelihood of success is not great.”15 
Although several scholars have explored the question of parity 
between federal and state courts in a variety of other contexts,16 the 
empirical question whether state courts are systematically biased 
against taxpayers seeking the protection of federal law has gone 
largely unexamined. This Article offers a preliminary exploration of 
that issue. Specifically, it presents a study of all reported state court 
decisions interpreting Public Law 86–272,17 a federal statute enacted 
in 1959 that provides businesses with immunity from state income 
taxes when they keep their activities in the taxing state beneath a 
specific threshold. State court decisions interpreting Public Law 86–
 
 10. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997); Sumner v. 
Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976).  
 11. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999). 
 12. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. at 275. 
 13. This phrasing comes from Burt Neuborne’s seminal article on the subject. Burt 
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1977). 
 14. See, e.g., William J. Quirk & C. Rhett Shaver, Does Congress Put Federalism at Risk 
When It Limits the States’ Power to Tax?, 21 STATE TAX NOTES 649, 649 (2001) (criticizing 
lack of federal forum as unfair); Doug Sheppard, Shining a Blue Light on Nexus: Katz and 
Rosen Debate the Kmart Decision, 23 STATE TAX NOTES 847, 849 (2002) (reporting criticism 
of the Tax Injunction Act); Doug Sheppard & Timothy Catts, U.S. Senator’s Reconciliation 
Has No Sales Tax “Streamlining” Language, 28 STATE TAX NOTES 528, 528 (2003) 
(describing taxpayer support for giving the United States Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction 
to hear certain disputes concerning the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement). 
 15. Quirk & Shaver, supra note 14, at 649.  
    16. See infra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.  
 17. Act of Sept. 14, 1959 §§ 101-04, Pub. L. No. 86–272, 73 Stat. 555, 555 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 381–84 (2000)). 
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272 may provide a means for measuring systemic bias. Because, 
depending on the circumstances, taxpayers and state tax 
administrators can be on either side of the legal issue. In most cases, 
the taxpayer seeks a broader reading of the statutory immunity, so as 
to establish its immunity from taxation in the taxing state. In some 
cases, however, the taxpayer seeks a narrower reading of the statute 
because doing so will establish its taxability in a state other than the 
taxing state, thus reducing its liability to the taxing state. Hence, 
while the legal issue in the cases—whether the taxpayer falls within 
the immunity provided by Public Law 86–272—remains roughly 
constant, the party benefiting from a broader or narrower construction 
of the statute varies from case to case. If state courts have 
consistently ruled in favor of state tax administrators, rather than 
adhering to consistent interpretations of the statute, this would be a 
fair indication of systemic bias. On the other hand, if state courts 
have interpreted the breadth of the immunity provided by Public Law 
86–272 consistently, regardless of which party stood to benefit, this 
would suggest state court impartiality. 
Unfortunately, due to the limited number of reported state court 
decisions interpreting Public Law 86–272 (only fifty-six decisions in 
all), this study cannot offer a statistically rigorous assessment of state 
court bias. Still, the study shows that, at least as a prima facie matter, 
these decisions provide little support for the assertion that state courts 
systematically disfavor taxpayers that seek the protection of federal 
law. Rather, state courts appear to have interpreted the immunity of 
Public Law 86–272 reasonably consistently, regardless of whether 
those holdings have benefited taxpayers or state governments. Again, 
these results do not reflect true statistical analysis; this evidence is 
only anecdotal. But the study at least suggests that substantial 
investigation will be necessary to determine whether the common 
“wisdom” concerning the bias of state courts against taxpayers is 
itself more myth than reality. 
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II. STATE TAXES, FEDERAL CLAIMS, AND STATE COURTS 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts have subject 
matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”18 But this general 
rule of federal question jurisdiction does not apply to cases in which a 
plaintiff challenges the validity of a state or local tax.19 With rare 
exception, taxpayers contending that a state or local tax violates 
federal law must assert their claims in state court. The principal 
reason is the longstanding equity practice of federal courts to 
withhold relief that would restrain the administration or collection of 
a state tax when an adequate legal remedy is available in state court.20 
In the 1870 case of Dows v. City of Chicago,21 for example, the 
Supreme Court explained that it was “of the utmost importance to 
[the states] that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should 
be interfered with as little as possible.”22 Consequently, no court 
sitting in equity shall “allow its injunction to issue to restrain their 
action, except where it may be necessary to protect the rights of the 
citizen whose property is taxed, and he has no adequate remedy by 
the ordinary processes of the law.”23  
 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 19. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
 20. See supra note 5. 
 21. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108 (1870). 
 22. Id. at 110. A more recent (and often quoted) expression of this idea is found in Justice 
Brennan’s separate opinion in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971): 
If federal declaratory relief were available to test state tax assessments, state tax 
administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the ordinary 
procedural requirements imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal suit 
the collection of revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed, with 
consequent damage to the State’s budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of 
taxpayer insolvency. Moreover, federal constitutional issues are likely to turn on 
questions of state tax law, which, like issues of state regulatory law, are more properly 
heard in the state courts. 
Id. at 128 n.17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
23. Id. In Matthews v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932), the Court likewise stated, 
[t]he scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments which 
should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere by 
injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief should be denied in 
every case where the asserted federal right may be preserved without it. . . . If the 
remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete, the aggrieved party is left to that 
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In 1937, Congress codified this well-established practice in the 
Tax Injunction Act.24 Since its enactment, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Act (as well as the underlying principles that 
motivated its adoption) to mandate that federal district courts lack 
jurisdiction to award any prospective relief in state tax cases unless 
“a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” is unavailable under state 
law.25 For example, in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman,26 
the Court held that, although the text of the Tax Injunction Act only 
forbids relief that “enjoin[s], suspend[s] or restrain[s]” state taxes, 
“its enactment is hardly an indication of disapproval of the policy of 
federal equity courts, or a mandatory withdrawal from them of their 
traditional power to decline jurisdiction in the exercise of their 
discretion.”27 Thus, independent of the Act, the antecedent equity 
practice prevents district courts from granting declaratory judgments, 
rather than only injunctions.28 Further, in California v. Grace 
Bretheren Church,29 the Court held that, “because Congress’ intent in 
enacting the Tax Injunction Act was to prevent federal-court 
interference with the assessment and collection of state taxes,” the 
Act itself “prohibits declaratory as well as injunctive relief.”30  
Meanwhile, the Court has construed the Tax Injunction Act’s 
exception, which permits federal jurisdiction when no “plain, speedy 
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State,”31 quite 
narrowly.32 Specifically, the Court has held that a state remedy is 
 
remedy in the state courts. 
Id. at 525–26. See also Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Benedict, 229 U.S. 481, 488 (1913); Boise 
Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 282 (1909); Shelton v. Platt, 139 
U.S. 591, 595–96 (1891). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). 
 25. See, e.g., Jefferson County, Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 424 (1999).  This reading is 
in line with the statutory text of 28 U.S.C. § 1341. However, as will be explained, the Court’s 
construction of the statute has been exceedingly broad, leading to questions of parity. 
 26. 319 U.S. 293 (1943). 
 27. Id. at 301. 
 28. Id. at 301–02. 
 29. 457 U.S. 393 (1982). 
 30. Id. at 411. 
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). 
 
 32. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 413 (1982). “In order to . . . 
be faithful to the congressional intent ‘to limit drastically’ federal-court interference with state 
tax systems, we must construe narrowly the ‘plain, speedy and efficient’ exception to the Tax 
Injunction Act.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol13/iss1/6
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“plain, speedy, and efficient” if it “meets certain minimal procedural 
criteria,”33 such that the taxpayer is afforded a meaningful 
opportunity to “assert his federal rights.”34  
In Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, for example, a taxpayer 
sought relief in federal court from her allegedly inequitable property 
assessment on the grounds that the remedy available under Illinois 
law was inadequate.35 Although Illinois typically forced taxpayers to 
wait two years for relief and paid no interest on refunds ultimately 
found due, the Court found Illinois’s remedial procedure to be plain, 
speedy, and efficient. The procedure ensured that all federal claims 
would be heard and decided, it imposed no undue hardships on the 
taxpayer, and the two-year delay was typical, even without paying 
interest.36  
Similarly, in Tully v. Griffin,37 the Court held that “a State’s 
remedy does not become ‘inefficient’ merely because a taxpayer 
must travel across a state line in order to resist or challenge the taxes 
sought to be imposed.”38 In Tully, a Vermont retailer sought an 
injunction in federal court to prevent the State of New York state 
from requiring the retailer to collect sales taxes on sales to New York 
customers.39 Because New York law permitted the taxpayer “to press 
its constitutional claims while preserving the right to challenge the 
amount of tax due,” the state’s procedure was fully adequate, thus 
precluding federal jurisdiction.40  
Wholly aside from the Tax Injunction Act or the underlying 
equity practice that it codified, the Supreme Court has held that the 
“fundamental principle of comity between federal courts and state 
governments” prohibits actions for damages against state or local tax 
administrators in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.41 Section 
1983 creates a private right of action for anyone who suffers “the 
 
 33. Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 512 (1981). 
 34. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 301 (1943). 
 35. Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 510. 
 36. Id. at 512–24. 
 37. 429 U.S. 68 (1976). 
 38. Id. at 73. See also Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 517.  
 39. Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 69 (1976). 
 40. Id. at 74. 
 41. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103 (1981). 
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deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws” of the United States at the hands of a person 
acting “under color of” state law.42 As the Court held in Monroe v. 
Pape,43 § 1983 plaintiffs generally can file suit directly in federal 
court, regardless of any remedies available under state law.44 In Fair 
Assessment in Real Estate v. McNary,45 however, the Court held that 
the principle of comity trumps this general rule of immediate access 
to federal court under § 1983. Taxpayers “are barred by the principle 
of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state 
tax systems in federal courts,” at least where state remedies “are 
plain, adequate, and complete.” 46 
Furthermore, even if a taxpayer were otherwise entitled to sue for 
damages in federal court, the Court has held that the sovereign 
immunity of the states protected by the Eleventh Amendment bars 
private actions for retrospective relief against unconsenting states in 
federal court.47 In other contexts, plaintiffs may partially circumvent 
a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity by suing the relevant state 
officer in her official capacity under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.48 
Such actions, however, are only permissible in the pursuit of 
 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 43. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 44. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“It is immaterial whether ‘the State has a 
law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state 
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.’”). 
See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1974) (“When federal claims are 
premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or 
administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal 
courts to protect constitutional rights.”); McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963) 
(“It is immaterial whether respondents’ conduct is legal or illegal as a matter of state law. Such 
claims are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts”). 
 45. 454 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 46. Id. at 116. 
 47. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1997) (“[F]ederal jurisdiction 
over suits against unconsenting States ‘was not contemplated by the Constitution when 
establishing the judicial power of the United States.’”) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 
15 (1890)). See also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3–25, at 522–23.  
 Note that this bar does not apply to suits against counties or municipalities. See Mt. 
Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 
U.S. 529, 530 (1890); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3–25, at 534 n.94. 
 48. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3–25, at 535. 
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prospective relief49—relief that is expressly foreclosed in state tax 
cases by the Tax Injunction Act and its antecedent equity practice.50 
Moreover, actions against state officers in their official capacities for 
retrospective relief (e.g., tax refunds) are treated as actions against 
the state itself, and are thus precluded by the Eleventh Amendment.51 
Consequently, state tax disputes are effectively barred from federal 
court, except in those rare instances when the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari to review a state court decision.52 
The common wisdom among state and local tax lawyers seems to 
be that the absence of a federal forum for state tax disputes strongly 
favors state governments. As recently stated by Arthur Rosen,53 
perhaps the most prominent practicing attorney in the field, granting 
state judiciaries the authority to decide all state tax cases “allows the 
foxes to guard the chickens.”54  
Commentators have offered a number of institutional explanations 
for why state courts might be prone to bias. First, state judges are 
often selected or retained through judicial elections. These 
majoritarian pressures might incline judges towards the interests of 
state governments rather than those of taxpayers, which are often out-
of-state corporations.55 Second, state judges are employees of the 
defendant state governments, and thus are paid from the same public 
 
 49. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663–66 (1974). See also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., 
The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1225 
(2001); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3–25, at 535-36.  
 50. See supra text accompanying notes 18–40. 
 51. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (“[A] suit by private parties seeking to impose a 
liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment . . . .”); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) 
(“[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the 
real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even 
though individual officials are nominal defendants.”). 
 52. The Supreme Court typically hears no more than two state tax cases each year. The 
Court heard two state tax cases this past Term. See Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 
648 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 963 (2003) (mem.); Franchise Tax Bd. 
v. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. 1683 (2003). The Court decided no state or local tax cases in October Term 
2001, and only one case in October Term 2000. See Dir. of Revenue v. Cobank ACB, 531 U.S. 
316 (2001). The Court decided only one state or local tax case in October Term 1999. See Hunt-
Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 528 U.S. 458 (2000).  
 53. Arthur Rosen is chairman of the state and local taxation department of McDermott, 
Will & Emery. 
 54. Sheppard, supra note 14, at 849. 
 55. See Neuborne, supra note 13, at 1127–28. 
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fisc that the taxpayers seek to diminish. Third, there may be “a series 
of psychological and attitudinal characteristics” that make state 
judges more inclined to construe rights protected by federal law more 
narrowly so as to avoid displacing state law.56 That is, a range of 
factors influencing the composition of state judiciaries might cause 
state judges to have a stronger allegiance to state law than would be 
ideal. Individually or collectively, these institutional characteristics 
could systematically and unfairly disadvantage taxpayers litigating 
legitimate claims in state court. 
Such distrust of state courts’ willingness to protect federal rights 
is hardly new. To the contrary, it is a deeply ingrained aspect of our 
constitutional fabric. As the Framers drafted Article III in the summer 
of 1787, one of their principal fears was that state courts would be 
unable or unwilling to enforce federal policy.57 For example, during 
the debates at the Convention as to whether the Constitution should 
provide for lower federal courts, James Madison asserted that 
“confidence [cannot] be put in the State Tribunals as guardians of the 
National authority and interests.”58 As Erwin Chemerinsky has 
explained, Madison believed that state judges were biased against 
federal law “and could not be trusted, especially in instances where 
there were conflicting State and federal interests.”59 In the famous 
case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,60 which established the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over decisions from state courts, Justice 
Story explained that the Constitution itself embraces this premise of 
mistrust: 
[A]dmitting that the judges of the state courts are, and always 
will be, of as much learning, integrity, and wisdom, as those of 
the courts of the United States, (which we very cheerfully 
admit,) it does not aid the argument. It is manifest that the 
 
 56. Id. at 1124. 
 57. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 2; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 4 n.17 (4th ed. 1996); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KANS. L. REV. 
1219, 1229 (1997) (“The framers created authority for a federal judiciary because of a belief 
that federal courts were essential to enforce federal law.”). 
 58. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 27 (1937). 
 59. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 3 (citing 2 FARRAND, supra note 58, at 27). 
 60. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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constitution has proceeded upon a theory of its own, and given 
or withheld powers according to the judgment of the American 
people, by whom it was adopted. . . . The constitution has 
presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that 
state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state 
interests, might some times obstruct, or control, or be supposed 
to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice. 61 
Today, the distrust of state courts as guarantors of federal rights 
remains a prominent justification for the federal question jurisdiction 
conferred by Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.62 According to the 
American Law Institute, for example, federal question jurisdiction is 
necessary “to protect litigants relying on federal law from the danger 
that state courts will not properly apply the law, either through 
misunderstanding or lack of sympathy.”63 
In short, the suspicion that state courts may be biased against 
taxpayers seeking the protection of federal law enjoys a distinguished 
constitutional pedigree. Nevertheless, over the past thirty years, the 
Supreme Court has embraced a contrary view, finding that such 
distrust of the state courts is misplaced.64 This theme has been most 
prominent in the Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence, where it has 
narrowed or closed various avenues for federal post-conviction 
review of state court proceedings.65 For instance, in Stone v. Powell,66 
 
 61. Id. at 346–47.  
 62. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 5.2.1, at 263. 
 63. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 168 (1969). 
 64. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 5.2.1, at 263 (“[T]he Supreme Court often has 
proclaimed that state courts are equal to federal courts in their ability and willingness to protect 
federal rights.”). As the Court recently stated in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999):  
We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the 
binding laws of the United States. The good faith of the States thus provides an 
important assurance that “this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” 
Id. at 755 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
 65. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 136–37 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). “[I]n the 
habeas context, the Court adheres to the view that there is no intrinsic reason why the fact that a 
man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned with 
respect to [federal law] than his neighbor in the state courthouse.” Id. (internal quotations 
omitted). See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985) (“[T]he federal habeas court, 
should, of course, give great weight to the considered conclusions of a coequal state 
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the Court held that a state prisoner cannot raise a Fourth Amendment 
claim in a federal habeas petition if he has been afforded “an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim in the state 
courts.”67 In so holding, the Court stated that “there is ‘no intrinsic 
reason why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him 
more competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the 
[consideration of Fourth Amendment claims] than his neighbor in the 
State Courthouse.’”68 
The Court has applied this reasoning in other contexts as well, 
endorsing the broader notion that the “Constitution and laws of the 
United States are not a body of law external to the States, 
acknowledged and enforced simply as a matter of comity.”69 Instead, 
the “Constitution is the basic law of the Nation, a law to which a 
State’s ties are no less intimate than those of the National 
Government itself.”70 Most significantly for present purposes, the 
Court has specifically stated that plaintiffs in state and local tax cases 
should not presume that they are disadvantaged merely from having 
to litigate in state court.71 In Grace Brethren Church, the Court 
quoted at length from Stone v. Powell, explaining that there was no 
reason for taxpayers to “assume . . . a general lack of appropriate 
sensitivity to constitutional rights in the . . . courts of the several 
States. State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional 
obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal 
law.”72  
In the years since Stone v. Powell, a large body of literature has 
developed assessing the Court’s thesis concerning the parity of 
 
judiciary.”). 
 66. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 n.37 (1982) (quoting Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)). 
 67. Id. at 469. 
 68. Id. at 493 n.35. (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 509 (1963)). 
 69. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997). 
 70. Id. at 275-76. See also Sandra Day O’Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the 
Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 801, 813 (1981) (“There is no reason to assume that state court judges cannot and will not 
provide a ‘hospitable forum’ in litigating federal constitutional questions.”). 
       71. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).  
 72. Id. (“State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard 
personal liberties and to uphold federal law.”). 
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federal and state courts in the protection of federal rights.73 In his 
seminal article, The Myth of Parity, Burt Neuborne provided an 
institutional explanation for why federal courts were likely to enforce 
federal constitutional rights more vigorously than state courts.74 He 
reasoned that federal courts possess a superior level of technical 
competence, that federal judges’ “psychological set” and attitudinal 
characteristics make them more inclined to protect federal rights, and 
that the federal judiciary enjoys greater insulation than state 
judiciaries from majoritarian pressures.75 He therefore argued that the 
Supreme Court’s idea of parity was at best a “dangerous myth,” and 
at worst a disingenuous means to facilitate the underenforcement of 
constitutional rights.76  
In contrast, Michael Solimine and James Walker published an 
empirical study in 1983 that found only a relatively small difference 
between federal and state courts in the frequency with which they 
upheld federal claims.77 Solimine and Walker examined 438 federal 
district court decisions and 608 state appellate court decisions 
addressing First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Equal 
Protection Clause claims between 1974 and 1980.78 They found that 
federal district courts upheld the federal claim in 41 percent of the 
cases, while state courts upheld the federal claim in 32 percent of the 
cases.79 They therefore concluded that there was “no clear reluctance 
on the part of state courts to uphold a federal claim that would be 
 
 73. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role 
for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity 
Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233 (1999); Burt 
Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 
797 (1995); William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599 
(1999); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State 
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983); 
Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the 
Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991). 
 74. Neuborne, supra note 13, at 1105–06. 
 75. Id. at 1121–25. 
 76. Id. at 1105–06. 
 77. See generally Solimine & Walker, supra note 73 (examining judicial parity between 
state and federal courts). 
 78. Id. at 238–46. 
 79. Id. at 240. 
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upheld in federal district courts.”80  
More recently, William Rubenstein evaluated the performance of 
federal and state courts in cases involving civil rights claims made by 
gays and lesbians.81 He found that “federal courts have not proved 
uniformly more hospitable to civil rights claims” and that “state 
courts have not abdicated their responsibilities to civil rights 
claimants.”82 To the contrary, Rubenstein found that gay litigants 
have actually been more successful in state courts than in federal 
courts.83 
These studies, along with several others,84 are helpful in assessing 
the general question of the comparative competencies of federal and 
state courts in the enforcement of federal law and individual rights. 
But, they fail to address the specific issue of the performance of state 
courts in state and local tax cases, where the relevant institutional 
pressures and incentives could be, for whatever reason, quite 
different. The following study, if nothing more, is intended to initiate 
a discussion of that question.  
III. STUDY DESIGN 
In attempting to design a study that could test whether state courts 
are biased against taxpayers asserting federal rights in state and local 
tax cases, it quickly became apparent that measuring such bias 
empirically would be extremely difficult. An inherent problem is that 
there is no obvious baseline against which to measure the 
performance of state courts, as federal courts rarely decide state and 
local tax cases.  
Unlike in some other areas of the law, then, the issue is not 
whether there is “parity” between state and federal courts in the 
protection of federal rights. Instead, the relevant question is whether 
state courts are biased against taxpayers that make federal claims. 
And assessing whether the outcomes of judicial decisions 
demonstrate bias is no easy task. By itself, examining a large sample 
 
 80. Id.  
 81. See Rubenstein, supra note 73. 
 82. Id. at 611. 
 83. Id. at 599. 
 84. See supra note 73. 
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of state and local tax decisions in which taxpayers asserted federal 
claims would tell us next to nothing. If taxpayers prevailed forty 
percent of the time, for example, we would have no basis for 
evaluating whether this showed bias, as we would have no way of 
determining how often taxpayers should have prevailed.  
One possible means of solving this problem is limiting the study 
to cases in which the question presented is whether federal law 
permits a state to assert its jurisdiction to tax a particular taxpayer. In 
most state and local tax cases raising the issue of jurisdiction, the 
question is whether the litigating state has jurisdiction to impose a 
levy on the protesting taxpayer. In a minority of jurisdiction cases, 
however, the dispute concerns the jurisdiction of a state other than the 
litigating state.  
A taxpayer will litigate the second type of jurisdiction issue 
because it can affect the portion of its income subject to taxation by 
the taxing state (that is, the state the taxpayer is suing for a refund). 
For instance, states that impose corporate income taxes generally 
permit multistate corporations to apportion their income among the 
states in which they are taxable.85 Thus, if a corporation is subject to 
another state’s jurisdiction, this will reduce the portion of the 
taxpayer’s income that is attributable to the taxing state, and hence its 
tax liability to that state. Moreover, states imposing corporate income 
taxes apportion a taxpayer’s income at least in part (and sometimes in 
full) based on the percentage of that corporation’s total sales made to 
customers in that state.86 Sales to customers in states where the 
 
 85. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION §§ 6.25, 
8.02[4] (3d ed. 2002). The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), 
which has been adopted in whole or in part by roughly half of the states that impose corporate 
income taxes, provides that “any taxpayer having income from business activity which is 
taxable both within and without this state . . . shall allocate and apportion his net income as 
provided in this Act.” UNIF. DIV. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 2, 7A U.L.A. 155 
(2002). See also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 571 (providing information on 
states that have adopted UDITPA). Section 3 of UDITPA further states that “a taxpayer is 
taxable in another state if [he is subject to tax on his income in that state or] that state has 
jurisdiction to subject the taxpayer to a net income tax regardless of whether, in fact, the state 
does or does not.” UNIF. DIV. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 3, 7A U.L.A. 160 (2002).  
 86. See RIA ALL STATES TAX GUIDE ¶ 223 (2001) (chart). Most states’ apportionment 
formulas use a combination of the taxpayer’s sales, property, and payroll in the state relative to 
the taxpayer’s total sales, property, and payroll. Id. For instance, UDITPA prescribes a formula 
that places equal weight on the taxpayer’s sales, property, and payroll factors. UNIF. DIV. OF 
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corporation is not taxable are usually “thrown back” to the state of 
origin, meaning that they are attributed to the state of shipment for 
purposes of computing the taxpayer’s sales factor.87 By successfully 
establishing its taxability in another state, the taxpayer can avoid the 
attribution of these sales to the taxing state and thereby reduce the 
portion of its income taxed by that state.  
We can therefore divide jurisdiction-to-tax cases into two basic 
categories: (1) cases in which the dispute concerns the litigating 
state’s jurisdiction (“Type A cases”); and (2) cases in which the 
dispute concerns the jurisdiction of a state other than the taxing state 
(“Type B cases”). In Type A cases, the state argues that the 
taxpayer’s contacts are sufficient to establish jurisdiction, while the 
taxpayer resists this characterization. In Type B cases, the roles are 
reversed: the taxpayer argues that its contacts are sufficient to 
establish its taxability in a particular state, while the litigating state 
contends that jurisdiction is lacking. At a broad level, the legal issue 
in both sets of cases remains constant: whether the taxpayer is subject 
to the taxing jurisdiction of a particular state. The variable is which 
party—the taxpayer or the state—stands to gain from a finding that 
the state in question has jurisdiction to tax the taxpayer.  
Because taxpayers and state tax authorities alternatively argue 
opposite sides of the same issue, these cases may allow us to 
overcome the problem of lacking a baseline. Specifically, comparing 
the results in Type A cases with those in Type B cases might provide 
a means for evaluating the existence of systemic bias. If state courts 
are impartial, one would expect them to decide that the state in 
question has jurisdiction to tax the taxpayer at roughly the same rate 
in all cases; there would be no correlation between the courts’ 
decisions and which party stood to gain from these rulings. In 
 
INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 168 (2002). See also John A. Swain, 
Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 419, 438 (2002). In recent years, a number of states have moved to a single-factor sales 
apportionment formula. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 491. 
 87. See Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Reflections 
on the Emerging Issues, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691, 703 (1998). Section 16(b) of UDITPA, for 
example, adopts a “throw back” rule for computing a taxpayer’s sales factor: “Sales of tangible 
personal property are in this state if . . . the property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, 
factory, or other place of storage in this state and . . . the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of 
the purchaser.” UNIF. DIV. OF INCOME TAX PURPOSES ACT § 16(b), 7A U.L.A. 183-84 (2002).  
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contrast, if state courts were substantially more inclined to find 
jurisdiction in Type A cases than in Type B cases, this would be 
decent evidence of systemic bias.  
Under the fairly broad heading of jurisdiction, we can isolate a 
more discrete legal issue so that the disputed legal issue remains 
more constant from case to case, yielding a cleaner means for 
assessing potential state court bias. Most reported decisions 
concerning the jurisdiction to tax involve questions of constitutional 
law under either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or the dormant Commerce Clause.88 But, there is also a 
significant federal statute governing the jurisdiction of states to 
impose income taxes on out-of-state businesses engaged in the sale of 
tangible personal property: Public Law 86–272 (sometimes called the 
“Interstate Commerce Tax Act” or the “Interstate Income Act”).89 
Congress enacted Public Law 86–272 in 1959, shortly after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement 
Co. v. Minnesota,90 in which the Court held for the first time that a 
state could impose a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned income 
tax on an out-of-state business engaged in purely interstate commerce 
in the taxing state.91 
Public Law 86–272 essentially creates a safe harbor for taxpayers 
that keep their activities in a given state below a specified threshold 
level.92 If a company does no more in a state than solicit orders, 
 
 88. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992) (holding that while 
the Due Process Clause permits a state to require an out-of-state vendor to collect use taxes on 
sales to the state’s residents, it may still lack the “substantial nexus” with the vendor necessary 
to take such action, as required by the dormant Commerce Clause); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. 
Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 251 (1987) (holding that the state’s imposition of 
a gross receipts tax on the taxpayer based on the physical presence of the taxpayer’s selling 
agent in the state was consistent with both the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause). 
See also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 85, at §§ 6.01–.15. 
 89. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86–272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 381–84, 391 (2002)). 
 90. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
 91. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 85, at § 4.10[1]. 
 92. See Heublein, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 409 U.S. 275, 279–82 (1972); HELLERSTEIN 
& HELLERSTEIN, supra note 85, at §§ 6.16–.17; Michael T. Fatale, Federalism and State 
Business Activity Tax Nexus: Revisiting Public Law 86–272, 21 VA. TAX REV. 435, 474–79 
(2002). Public Law 86–272 provides in relevant part: 
No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for any taxable 
year ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on the income derived within 
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engage in activities that are entirely ancillary to the solicitation of 
orders, or engage in activities unrelated to such solicitation that are 
nor more than de minimis, that state is prohibited from imposing an 
income tax on the company.93 To maintain this safe harbor, the 
taxpayer cannot maintain an office in the taxing state, and any orders 
taken by the taxpayer’s employees must be “sent outside the State for 
approval or rejection, and, if approved . . . filled by shipment or 
delivery from a point outside the State.”94 The taxpayer may employ 
an independent contractor who maintains an office in the state, but 
that contractor must work for more than one principal.95  
Since its enactment, Public Law 86–272 has engendered a number 
of disputes concerning the exact contours of the immunity it 
provides. The resulting body of state court decisions therefore offers 
a chance to explore the issue of state court bias against taxpayers 
asserting federal rights in state tax cases. Most Public Law 86–272 
cases are Type A cases, in which the dispute concerns an out-of-state 
taxpayer’s activities in the state against which it is litigating. For 
example, in the recent case of Peterson v. State Tax Assessor,96 the 
taxpayer operated a dental supply business that was domiciled in 
New Hampshire and conducted business in Maine.97 When Maine 
imposed an income tax on the business, the taxpayer argued that its 
contacts in Maine (which included picking up items from customers, 
 
such State by any person from interstate commerce if the only business activities 
within such State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable year are either, or 
both, of the following: 
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for 
sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for 
approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a 
point outside the State; and 
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in 
the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by 
such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from 
such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1). 
15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (2000). 
 93. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 228–31 (1992); see 
also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 85, at § 6.18.  
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1). 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 381(c)–(d). 
 96. 724 A.2d 610 (Me. 1999). 
 97. Id. at 611. 
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loaning items to customers, and accepting payment for certain orders) 
were either ancillary to the solicitation of orders or de minimis.98  
A minority of Public Law 86–272 cases, however, are Type B 
cases, in which the dispute concerns the taxpayer’s activities in some 
other state. For instance, in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Department of 
Revenue99 the taxpayer was a pharmaceutical manufacturer that had a 
distribution warehouse in Oregon and made substantial sales to 
customers in Washington.100 Although Washington did not tax the 
company’s income (because it has no state income tax), the company 
sought to apportion a percentage of its income to Washington, and 
thus reduce its income tax liability to Oregon.101 The question 
presented, then, was whether the taxpayer’s activities in Washington 
(which included employing twelve salespeople, providing them with 
product samples, and allowing them to replace customers’ damaged 
goods) exceeded the threshold level permitted by Public Law 86–
272.102 The taxpayer argued that it was not entitled to the statutory 
immunity in Washington, while Oregon argued that it was.103  
A comparison of these two sets of cases potentially allows us to 
evaluate the performance of state courts in the protection of 
taxpayers’ federal rights. If state courts are just as likely to find that 
the taxpayer falls within the immunity provided by Public Law 86–
272 in Type A cases as Type B cases, this would suggest that state 
courts are impartial. But, if state courts have systematically favored 
state tax authorities, construing the same statutory immunity more 
narrowly in Type A cases than in Type B cases, this would indicate 
state court bias against taxpayers. 
IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In surveying all reported state court decisions handed down since 
the enactment of Public Law 86-272 in 1959, there are a total of fifty-
six decisions construing the breadth of the immunity provided by the 
 
 98. Id. at 613. 
 99. 546 P.2d 1081 (Or. 1976). 
 100. Id. at 1082. 
 101. Id. at 1081–82. 
 102. Id. at 1082–83. 
 103. Id. at 1082. 
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Statute.104 Forty-six of these are Type A cases, where an out-of-state 
taxpayer argued for immunity from income taxation in the litigating 
state.105 The remaining ten are Type B cases, where the taxpayer 
contended that its activities in another, non-litigating state exceeded 
the threshold for retaining the statutory immunity.106 Unfortunately, 
due to the small sample size (particularly with respect to Type B 
cases), rigorous or robust statistical conclusions concerning the 
existence of state court bias are impossible. Nonetheless, the results 
tend to undermine at least any prima facie case that State courts have 
been biased against taxpayers in decisions construing Public Law 86–
272. 
TABLE 1 
REPORTED STATE APPELLATE DECISIONS INTERPRETING PUBLIC 
LAW 86–272 
(n = 56) 
 State in Question has 
Jurisdiction  
(“narrow construction”) 
State in Question Does 
Not Have Jurisdiction 
(“broad construction”) 
Type A cases 
(n=46) 
30 
(65%) 
16 
(35%) 
Type B cases 
(n=10) 
6 
(60%) 
4 
(40%) 
 
 104. Several decisions that involved Public Law 86–272, but which did not interpret the 
breadth of the statutory immunity, were excluded from the study. For example, in Hoffmann-
LaRoche, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 161 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), the taxpayer 
asserted that California’s apportionment formula, by “throwing back” sales from states in which 
the taxpayer was not taxable under Public Law 86–272 to the state of shipment, resulted in 
unconstitutional, extraterritorial taxation. Id. at 842. In International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 
164 So. 2d 314 (La. 1964), the state tax collector argued that Public Law 86-272 exceeded 
Congress’s legislative authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 321. These types of cases 
were excluded because they did not present instances in which the legal issue, the breadth of the 
immunity provided by Public Law 86–272, could be kept roughly constant. Without this 
constant in the two sets of cases, no basis would exist for evaluating whether the decisions 
exhibit bias against taxpayers. The study also included no more than one decision from the 
same litigated action, fearing distortion the representativeness of the cases. For example, it 
includes the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in William Wrigley, Jr. Co. v. Wisconsin 
Dep’t of Revenue, 465 N.W.2d 800 (Wis. 1991), but excludes the prior holding of the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals in the same action, 451 N.W.2d 444 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).  
 105. See Appendix A. 
 106. See Appendix B. 
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Overall, the outcomes reveal a reasonably consistent interpretation 
of the statute. In both Type A and Type B cases, state courts have 
more frequently held that the taxpayer was subject to the jurisdiction 
of the state in question to impose an income tax. Moreover, the rate at 
which state courts have held in favor of taxability is quite similar in 
Type A (65%) and Type B (60%) cases. The slight discrepancy 
indicates that, to the extent state courts have favored one side, it has 
indeed been that of the states. But, the degree of this favoritism is 
relatively small, particularly given the sample size. 
It is important to bear in mind that, in addition to the problem of a 
small sample size, there are some potentially confounding variables 
that make the drawing of conclusions from these results problematic. 
First, there may be a significant selection bias in those cases that are 
litigated to the point that they result in reported decisions. If the state 
and local tax community widely assumes that state courts are biased 
in favor of state tax authorities, then taxpayers will tend to litigate 
only those cases in which they have the strongest arguments for 
relief. Consequently, the cases that result in reported decisions might 
represent a skewed range of the potential legal disputes between 
taxpayers and state governments over the meaning of Public Law 86–
272. Such a selection bias would tend to mask or understate the 
actual level of state court bias against taxpayers.  
Second, Type A and Type B cases may not be truly comparable. 
The two categories are dissimilar in at least one important respect: in 
Type A cases, the state whose jurisdiction is at issue has already 
attempted to impose a tax on the taxpayer; in Type B cases, this has 
not occurred.107 As a result, one might expect it to be more difficult to 
establish the state’s jurisdiction to tax in Type B cases than in Type A 
cases, as the state in question presumably would have imposed a tax 
on the company already if it had believed that it had the jurisdiction 
to do so. We would therefore expect unbiased courts to find in favor 
 
 107. States generally accept that a multistate company is taxable in another state if that 
other state has, in fact, taxed the company, thus rendering the question of the other state’s 
jurisdiction moot. Section 3 of UDITPA states that “for purposes of allocation and 
apportionment of income under this Act, a taxpayer is taxable in another state if (1) in that state 
he is subject to a net income tax, a franchise tax measured by net income, a franchise tax for the 
privilege of doing business, or a corporate stock tax.” UNIF. DIV. OF INCOME FOR TAX 
PURPOSES ACT § 3, 7A U.L.A. 160 (2002). 
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of the state’s jurisdiction to tax less frequently in Type B cases than 
in Type A cases, thus skewing the study’s results in the opposite 
direction of the selection bias described above.  
Finally, a study limited to reported opinions may miss much of 
what is being decided by state tribunals. It is conceivable, for 
instance, that rulings unfavorable to taxpayers at the trial level here 
systematically foreclosed successful appeals, such that many disputes 
are resolved without any reported decision. If this were the case, state 
courts could exhibit significant bias against taxpayers with little or no 
evidence of that bias appearing in reported judicial opinions.  
In short, more sophisticated analyses, surveying a larger number 
of cases and compensating for these confounding variables, will be 
necessary to provide a statistically robust evaluation of whether state 
courts are biased against taxpayers raising federal claims in state and 
local tax cases. This study is merely a preliminary step in that 
direction. Yet, the study’s results at least suggest that the common 
“wisdom” concerning state courts is not obviously true, at least with 
respect to litigation arising under Public Law 86–272. Reported state 
court decisions interpreting the statute do not, on their face, show any 
evident bias against taxpayers. We will therefore need a fair bit more 
investigation before we can confidently separate myth from reality 
with respect to the performance of state courts in state and local tax 
cases. 
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